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Introduction: Blessed are the
Compromisers?
Robert F. Cochran, Jr.*
Pepperdine's Nootbaar Institute was honored to have Sanford Levinson
deliver the 2010 Brandeis lecture. His topic, "Compromise and
Constitutionalism," addresses how we might live with our greatest
differences. Levinson's lecture, along with responses from some of the
nation's leading scholars of jurisprudence, constitutional law, legal history,
and dispute resolution, is included in this symposium edition of the
Pepperdine Law Review.
This past year also saw two other memorable events in the life of
Pepperdine, the Nootbaar Institute, and the Nootbaar family. We
experienced the joys of Herbert Nootbaar's 102nd birthday. At age 102,
Herb remains vital, energetic, and strong. His comments at his birthday
party were full of his usual grace and self-deprecating humor. The other
event was a sad one. On the day that I sat down to write this introduction,
we learned of Elinor Nootbaar's death. She passed away following a long
illness.
Both Herb and Elinor have been wonderful patrons of the Institute,
supporting its many endeavors, sharing visits with the students we send
around the world to do justice-related work, and attending many of our
academic events. Among the many ways Elinor supported the work of the
Nootbaar Institute, one of her most important contributions was that of
encouragement. On many occasions, a conversation with Elinor left me, the
Nootbaar Fellows, our staff, and other people associated with the Institute
excited to continue the work of bringing justice and the insights and
compassion of Jesus to those Jesus called "the least of these." Herb and
Elinor's encouragement, compassion, and generosity are very much on my
mind as I write this introduction.
Many will find irony in the fact that the Louis D. Brandeis Lecture is
about "Compromise and Constitutionalism," for Brandeis is well-known as
one of the Supreme Court's great dissenters. This suggests he was more
* Louis D. Brandeis Professor of Law and Director of the Herbert and Elinor Nootbaar
Institute on Law, Religion, and Ethics, Pepperdine University.
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likely to dissent than to compromise. But as Professor Levinson points out
in his lecture, even Brandeis recognized the value of compromise and chose
his dissents carefully. Brandeis wrote to Felix Frankfurter, "You may have a
very important case of your own as to which you do not want to antagonize
[other justices] on a less important case." For Brandeis, there was a time to
dissent and a time to compromise.
It is not surprising that many of the essays in this symposium address
some aspect of religious faith and compromise. The commentators' views
range from that of Carrie Menkel-Meadow that religion may be
uncompromising to that of Richard Weisberg that Christianity, at least, will
be quick to compromise. (Our ambivalent attitudes toward compromise is
captured in the fact that readers are likely to view both "uncompromising"
and "compromise" in the prior sentence as negatives.)
Word searches of the Christian Bible's popular New International
Version and its traditional King James Version do not reveal a single use of
the word "compromise." But compromise appears to be a necessary
component of much that Jesus calls for in his most famous sermon, "The
Sermon on the Mount." Among the nine "beatitudes" with which the
sermon begins,2 Jesus identifies both "those who hunger and thirst for
[justice]"' and those who are "peacemakers" 4 as blessed. There is tension
1. MELVIN 1. UROFSKY, Louis D. BRANDEIS: A LIFE 579 (2009) (cited infra by Sanford
Levinson in Compromise and Constitutionalism).
2. Unless otherwise indicated, all translations herein are from the New International Version
("NIV").
Blessed are the meek, for they will inherit the earth. Blessed are those who hunger and
thirst for [justice], for they will be filled. Blessed are the merciful, for they will be shown
mercy. Blessed are the pure in heart, for they will see God. Blessed are the
peacemakers, for they will be called children of God. Blessed are those who are
persecuted because of [justice], for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. Blessed are you
when people insult you, persecute you and falsely say all kinds of evil against you
because of me.
Matthew 5:5-11. For an explanation of the use of "justice," rather than "righteousness" (the original
translation) in the bracketed portions above, see infra note 3.
3. See Matthew 5:6. The Greek word "dikaiosunj," translated here as "justice" is traditionally
translated "righteousness." For an exception using "justice," see the Jerusalem Bible, cited in
Nicholas Wolterstorffs Justice. NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF, JUSTICE: RIGHTS AND WRONGS Ill
(2008). As Nicholas Wolterstorff notes, the same word is commonly translated "justice" in English
versions of Plato's Republic. Id. at 109-10. Wolterstorff argues that either translation is
linguistically possible and that the proper translation must be determined based on context. Id. at
112-13. The word is used again in the beatitudes, "Blessed are those who are persecuted because of
[dikaiosuni's] ..... Matthew 5:10. Traditional translations here also use "righteousness," but as
Wolterstorff notes, "Apparently, the [traditional] translators were not struck by the oddity of
someone being persecuted because he is righteous. My own reading of human affairs is that
righteous people are either admired or ignored, not persecuted; people who pursue justice are the
ones who get in trouble." WOLTERSTORFF, supra, at 111. Dikaiosund is probably a richer word than
any English translation, encompassing both an inner goodness and a just society. In Plato's
Republic, dikaiosund is both. PLATO, THE REPUBLIc bk. I, at 28, bk. IV, at 125 (A.D. Lindsay,
trans., Alfred A. Knopf rev. ed. 1992) (c. 380 B.C.E.).
Jesus is a strong proponent of justice elsewhere. For example, on another occasion, he
exclaims, "[W]ill not God bring about justice for his chosen ones, who cry out to him day and night?
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between these two beatitudes. A commitment to both of them is likely to
require compromise.
Two other qualities praised in the beatitudes-"Blessed are the meek"5
and "Blessed are the merciful" 6-are likely to move people toward
compromise. But the two final beatitudes- Blessed are those who are
persecuted because of [justice]"' and "Blessed are you when people insult
you, persecute you and falsely say all kinds of evil against you because of
me"'-suggest that followers of Jesus should not compromise as to some
matters and should even be willing to suffer persecution, rather than
compromise.
The beatitudes which praise justice and peacemaking suggest the words
of this introduction's title: "Blessed are the compromisers?" The pursuit of
both justice and peace may require compromise. But the final two
beatitudes' emphasis on holding to principle suggests that there is a time not
to compromise-hence the question mark in title.
Some of the lectures that follow argue that compromise is a necessary
part of government. Two authors quote Edmund Burke's statement, made as
he criticized George III for failing to compromise with the upstart North
American colonies: "All government-indeed every human benefit and
enjoyment, every virtue and every prudent act-is founded on compromise
and barter."9 Mark A. Graber, in his essay, identifies compromise as: "the
high price of sharing constitutional space with those whose values are
fundamentally different than ours." Two authors (Paul Finkelman and
Richard H. Weisberg) argue that compromise has led to or maintained two
of the worst human rights violations in history (slavery and the Holocaust).
The lecture and responses herein address compromise in light of many
of the great issues of the past-slavery, government structure, racial
segregation, the Holocaust, and Yalta, as well many of the great issues
facing the United States today-health care, taxes, abortion, and the death
penalty. It might help to sharpen the reader's consideration of our
commentators' discussion to ask whether today's pro-life advocates and gay
marriage advocates should compromise (e.g., if given the opportunity,







9. AVISHAI MARGALIT, ON COMPROMISE AND ROTTEN COMPROMISES 12 (2009) (quoting
Edmund Burke, Speech on Conciliation with the Colonies (Mar. 22, 1775)) (quoted in this
symposium by Sanford Levinson and Steven D. Smith).
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should agree to protection of the unborn after viability in exchange for those
who are pre-viability or agree to accept domestic partnership status for
homosexual couples and give up on equal marital status). The standards
suggested by our commentators are likely to push such advocates in different
directions.
Professor Levinson's Brandeis lecture, Compromise and
Constitutionalism, explores compromises (1) that went into the making of
the United States Constitution, and (2) that have occurred in the Supreme
Court's constitutional interpretation. He explores these compromises in
light of Israeli philosopher Avishai Margalit's distinction between bad
compromises and rotten compromises. 1o "Rotten compromises" are
indefensible except, perhaps, in the most exceptional of conditions. A
"rotten political compromise" is one that agrees "to establish or maintain an
inhuman regime, a regime of cruelty and humiliation, that is, a regime that
does not treat humans as humans."" Under this standard, Levinson
identifies as rotten compromises the Constitution's protection of slavery and
the Supreme Court's dismissal, shortly after Brown v. Board of Education,
of a case challenging Virginia's inter-racial marriage ban.12  Levinson
acknowledges that anti-slavery founders would argue that they had to agree
to protect slavery in order to create a country and, likely, avoid future wars.
And that Supreme Court Justices would argue that they had to dismiss the
Virginia case in order to get the country to accept Brown. Levinson
identifies as not-so-rotten compromises the founders granting equal
representation to states in the Senate and dismissing the case challenging
"under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance. Levinson strikes a balance that
some of his commentators challenge for being pro-compromise and some for
being anti-compromise. But much of his lecture simply raises difficult
questions-Stephen Smith accuses him of having more question marks than
periods. Many thanks to Professor Levinson for raising and helping us to
think through questions which allow no easy answers.
Paul Finkelman's The Cost of Compromise and the Covenant with
Death challenges the practice of compromise with a history of the
Compromise of 1850 (which protected slaveholder interest in their
"property" and admitted various slave and free states to the Union). He
suggests that these were not only rotten compromises in the
Margalit/Levinson sense-maintaining "an inhuman regime"-but bad
compromises in a different sense, giving much to the pro-slavery forces and
gaining little for the anti-slavery cause. Finkelman argues that the
Compromise of 1850 gave the South additional time to arm itself and to
develop industrial capacity and that it left Southerners believing that they
10. Id.
I1. Id. at 2.
12. Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985 (1956).
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could demand and win anything. They became overconfident, demanded
more and more, and in the end secession was their only solution. Professor
Finkelman's lesson: "compromise is not always possible or worthwhile." 3
Mark Graber's Constitutional Democracy, Human Dignity, and
Entrenched Evil argues that, rather than contrasting principles and
compromise, we should recognize that "compromise is rooted in the same
kinds of principles as equality, justice, liberty, human dignity, and other
constitutional goods."' 4  Graber reflects on a hypothetical constitutional
compromise posed by Walter F. Murphy (a mentor to both Graber and
Levinson). A constitutional convention agrees to the following compromise
provisions: "human life is sacred," but "the political processes [will] make
the initial choice [whether to protect unborn human life]."' He identifies
various means that might be used to interpret these provisions. Graber
challenges advocates who assume that their opponents have evil motives.
"Advocates who claim that pro-life advocates are misogynists or who equate
abortion clinics with concentration camps do not treat rival positions as
grounded in reasonable, if mistaken, conception of human flourishing." 6
Graber holds up Lincoln as a model-he showed charity to those with whom
he disagreed, even over the most important of issues. Graber also argues for
resolution of great moral issues through democratic processes.
"[C]ommitments to democracy provide more practical protections for basic
human rights than commitments to constitutionalism." 7 Nevertheless, we
are confronted with a challenge: "For better and undoubtedly worse, human
beings constantly find themselves in environments where they must
cooperate with persons whom they find, if not morally reprehensible on
most subjects, morally reprehensible on some subjects.""
Carrie Menkel-Meadow's The Variable Morality of Constitutional (and
Other) Compromises argues that "sometimes, not always, compromise may
itself be a moral good, justified because of the outcomes it permits (peace,
some forms of justice and desert) and the process itself which recognizes the
claims of 'another side' and takes them seriously." 9 Nevertheless, she
13. Paul Finkelman, The Cost of Compromise and the Covenant With Death, 38 PEPP. L. REV.
845, 888 (2011).
14. Mark A. Graber, Constitutional Democracy, Human Dignity, and Entrenched Evil, 38 PEPP.
L. REV. 889, 894 (2011).
15. Id. at 895 (quoting WALTER F. MURPHY, CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY: CREATING AND
MAINTAINING A JUST POLITICAL ORDER 315, 321 (2007)).
16. Id. at 896.
17. Id. at 897.
18. Id. at 902.
19. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Constitutional (and Other) Compromises: A Comment on Sanford
Levinson's Compromise and Constitutionalism, 38 PEPP. L. REv. 903, 904 (2011).
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states: "[W]istfully, I assert here, we will never be able to judge
compromises or that seemingly greater good-'principled' decisions-by a
universal standard. All compromises, whether of great constitutional,
diplomatic, political, or 'lesser' personal or commercial moment, must be
judged by the greater context in which they are situated."20
Though I am sensitive to the need when assessing the compromises of
others or making our own to consider context, I am not so sure that we can
"never" judge compromises or "'principled' decisions" by a universal
standard. It seems to me, for example, that time, experience, and reason
enable us to identify some universal standards. Most of the authors of this
collection rightly, it seems to me, assume that slavery violates a universal
standard, though they disagree over whether the compromises that allowed it
in the United States were worth the candle. I hope that 150 or 200 years
from now, experience and reason will enable our ancestors to have a clearer
view of our moral foibles (and will be gracious in their assessment of them).
Admittedly, our understanding of evil is limited and grows slowly, if at all.
It seems that slavery, the Holocaust, and racial segregation are the only
things that one can identify as evils today without losing a significant
portion of one's audience. Surely some things are evil and should be
identified as such.
Steven D. Smith's Lessons from Lincoln assumes that there is evil, but
argues that our ability to assess it is limited. "The ethics of compromise
essentially involve the problem of how to live morally in a morally
disordered world-a world in which the people we live with and care about
are morally disordered, and in which we know that but not always when or
how we ourselves are morally disordered."2 1
He criticizes uncompromising purists as "morally self-indulgent ...
valuing their own virtue above the welfare of their fellows . . .. fail[ing] to
take seriously the possibility that they might be wrong ... . [and falling] into
self-deception... ."22 Drawing from Lincoln's arguments in the
Lincoln/Douglas debates, Smith identifies two precepts for appropriate
compromise. First, we should fight evil where we can, but "accepting an
existing evil is quite different than agreeing to introduce or extend an evil
where it does not presently exist., 23  Second, even when we must
compromise with evil, we have a responsibility to "declare that the practice
was in fact evil."24
Richard H. Weisberg's Levinson Is to Mr. Justice "Isaiah" as St. Paul
Was to the Prophet Isaiah criticizes Levinson's defense of compromise.
20. Id. at 905.
21. Steven D. Smith, Lessons from Lincoln: A Comment on Levinson, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 915, 915
(2011).
22. Id. at 916.
23. Id. at 919.
24. Id. at 920.
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Weisberg blames the western tendency to compromise texts on the Christian
(mis)interpretation of Hebrew texts. More particularly, Weisberg accuses
the Vatican of compromising its Nazi-era Jewish advocacy in an informal
contact with Vichy France. Both Weisberg's claim concerning Christianity
in general25 and his claim concerning the Vatican26 are subject to challenge.
(The tendency to compromise textual integrity strikes me as, not so much
western or Christian, but universal-people in power do not like limits,
textual or otherwise.) What is not subject to challenge is the fact that many
Christians in both Germany and France compromised the teachings of Jesus,
failing to stand up to the Nazi's treatment of Jews. They separated their
faith from their relationship with the state by a high wall. The tragedy is that
their failure to live out Jesus' teachings in all of life is likely to be a barrier
between Christians and Jews for decades to come. Elsewhere,2 7 Weisberg
presents the clear, powerful, and challenging example of the compromises of
Vichy lawyers who, rather than presenting a frontal attack on Vichy statutes
25. Jesus, far from downgrading commandments to "suggestions," as suggested by Professor
Weisberg, called his hearers to experience a change of heart that would lead them, not only to not to
murder and commit adultery, but not get angry, and not engage in lust. See Matthew 5:21-22, 27-
30; Richard H. Weisberg, Levinson Is to Mr. Justice "Isaiah" as St. Paul Was to the Prophet Isaiah,
38 PEPP. L. REV. 925, 930 (2011). Jesus argued that he did not come to change the law, but to fulfill
it. Matthew 5:17. He claimed, not to be compromising the teachings of the Hebrew scriptures, but
to be getting to their true meaning. If anything, these are higher standards than the original Hebrew
law, but Jesus offered his eternal, mystical presence as an aid in that change of heart. DALLAS
WILLARD, THE DIVINE CONSPIRACY, 144-68, 271-83 (1998).
Weisberg also argues that Christians (mis)appropriated Hebrew prophesies and applied them
to Jesus. Most Christian interpreters seek to show how the original intent of the prophetic message
is perpetuated in the teachings of Jesus and the Church. The early Christians continued the Hebrew
practice of seeing the events of their lives in light of the teachings of the Hebrew prophets. As
Gerhard von Rad notes, "a prophetic prediction, which was at one time directed towards a particular
political situation and all of a sudden applied to a quite different period, can often be observed in the
Old Testament." GERHARD VON RAD, THE MESSAGE OF THE PROPHETS 270 (Eduard Haller ed.,
D.M.G. Stalker trans., Harper & Row 1972) (1967). The Christian interpreters of Jesus do the same
thing when they speak of the fulfillment of a prophecy. There is continuity between the use of older
material by later Hebrew writers and the use of Hebrew Scriptures by Christian writers. For a
discussion of the Jewish and Christian uses of Messianic prophesy, see DONALD JUEL, MESSIANIC
EXEGESIS: CHRISTOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF THE OLD TESTAMENT IN EARLY CHRISTIANITY
(1988).
26. Professor Weisberg bases his argument that the Vatican compromised its support for Jews on
Vichy lawyer Leon Berard's claim that "an authorized person at the Vatican told [him that] they
mean no quarrel with the [Vichy] Jewish laws." Weisberg, supra note 25, at 934 (quoting RICHARD
H. WEISBERG, VICHY LAW AND THE HOLOCAUST IN FRANCE 423-24 (1996) (quoting Berard's letter
to Petain)). For Weisberg's documentation of this claim, see RICHARD H. WEISBERG, VICHY LAW
AND THE HOLOCAUST IN FRANCE (1996). Running counter to the Berard report are the substantial
public and private Vatican efforts to combat the anti-Jewish actions of the Nazis in France and
elsewhere. For documentation challenging the Berard report, see RONALD J. RYCHLAK, RIGHTEOUS
GENTILES: HOW PIUS XII AND THE CATHOLIC CHURCH SAVED HALF A MILLION JEWS FROM THE
NAzIS 156-64 (2005).
27. See RICHARD H. WEISBERG, VICHY LAW AND THE HOLOCAUST IN FRANCE (1996).
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defining Jews, argued that their clients did not fit the statutory definition.
They may have saved some clients, but thereby legitimized a statute that
condemned many Jews to deprivation of property, to prison, and to death.
The symposium concludes with Professor Levinson's responses to his
commentators.
Our thanks to the contributors to this symposium for their engaging and
thoughtful comments. My prayer is that this exchange will help us to
understand how to pursue both justice and peace in a world that needs a lot
of both.
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